So if you are willing, we shall begin our inquiry as to its nature in cities, and after that let us continue our inquiry in the individual also, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less.
Introduction: From Basic Rationales to Relative Merits (and Back)
We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed for a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individual good; or as that whose presence brings anything into a satisfactory and self-sufficing condition; or as self-sufficiency; or as what produces, maintains or entails characteristics of this kind, while preventing or destroying their opposites. * * * Since, however, it often happens that people agree that two things are both useful but do not agree about which is the more so, the next step will be to treat of relative goodness and relative utility.
Aristotle, Rhetoric. 4 Aristotle, with amazing prescience (if comical cumbrousness), neatly anticipates the twin tasks of today's students of philanthropy 5 : to move from defining philanthropy's distinctive goodness to measuring that goodness and comparing it with others. As he suggests, beginning the latter task implies having completing the former; before measuring, first identify what is to be measured. Students of philanthropy have wrestled with the first of these two fundamental questions for the better part of three decades -without, alas, finding a fully satisfactory answer. 4 ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 42-46 (W. Rhys Roberts, trans., Modern Library ed., 1954). 5 This sector goes by various other names. Economists tend to call it the nonprofit sector; political scientists, the voluntary sector; sociologists, "civil society." As we shall see in more detail below, infra Part II.A, its constituent organizations have two defining attributes: they are voluntary, and they are nonprofit. They include public benefit organizations, mutual benefit organizations, and cooperatives. The focus of this paper is the first of these three types, more commonly called charities or philanthropies. Somewhat in tension with general practice, I use "philanthropy" to cover the entire sector, not simply the subsector of public benefit organizations; where the difference matters, as in taxation, I will be more specific. Although, in describing public benefit organizations, "charity" is more commonly used than "philanthropy," the latter term suits this project much better. Not least, philanthropy is the name of its sponsor, the National Center on Philanthropy and the Law. "Philanthropy" also has the advantage of its etymology, "love of humankind." "Charity," on the other hand, has lost much of that connotation, despite its eloquent expression in Paul's Second Epistle to the Church at Corinth. What is worse, in the narrower sense of "alms-giving," "charity" tends to connote that its recipients are somehow insufficiently self-reliant, and thus that they should bear a measure of shame or other social stigma. See THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES (MISHNEH TORAH), BOOK VII, THE BOOK OF AGRICULTURE 92-93 (Issac Klein, trans., 1979) [hereafter MISHNEH TORAH] ("One should always restrain himself and submit to privation rather than be dependent upon other people or cast himself upon public charity….").
If anything, we have come to appreciate Mencken's wry wisdom: "there is always a well-known solution to every human problem -neat, plausible, and wrong". 6 And at least some of us have come to rue our own efforts 7 to improve on Aristotle's comprehensive, if cumbrous, definition of goodness. The upshot is this: We have no single entirely satisfactory unified field theory of philanthropy. 8 Yet, even as we accept yesterday's embarrassment of theoretical riches, we are pressed, perhaps today more than ever before, to add a new layer of analytic complexity.
Onto our multiple theories of why philanthropies arise and what functions they serve, we now want to overlay a metric of philanthropy's relative merits. Beyond our theories of what makes philanthropies distinctive, and distinctively good, we are trying to extrapolate ways to compare their goodness, or goodnesses. Having analyzed philanthropy as a matter of kind, we now want to assess it as a matter of degree. That effort to move from qualitative to quantitative, from defining the hallmarks of philanthropic purpose to setting the benchmarks of philanthropic achievement, is the theme of this paper.
Its thesis is that the standard theory of philanthropy delivers both less than we need and more than it promises: Less than we need, because it at best brackets, and at worst begs, our most basic questions about philanthropy: Is what it does really good?
And what does it require of me? But also more than it promises, because, if carefully reconsidered, it both shows why it cannot give us what we want and points us to where
we can find what we need. That source, it turns out, is the philanthropic sector itself. In trying to derive the function of the philanthropic sector from its sectoral siblings, the market and the state, the standard model makes philanthropy the subordinate and supplementary sector. And yet, in doing that, the standard model produces a peculiar paradox: The most distinctive way that philanthropy supplements the other sectors' functions is to provide us with standards by which we assess not only all three sectors, but also our individual roles within them. Even as we begin to measure philanthropy by the standards of the other sectors, we find that we must measure them by standards only the philanthropic sector can give us. And so, as we shall see, what standard theory seeks to measure it shows us to be both the measure and the measurer of all.
But, even as we come to appreciate that paradox, we find ourselves approaching another. In our liberal democratic and capitalist market economy, the complementary philanthropic sector must be voluntary and pluralistic. Accordingly, our philanthropic sector's component organizations produce, not one vision of the social and individual good, but many, each with its own measures of performance. What's more, many of these normative visions are at odds with each other; and some are at odds with the other sectors as they are now constituted. This, then, is the standard theory's second paradox:
Liberal democracy and market capitalism cannot provide standards for choosing among those competing normative standards philanthropy offers; to assess the normative offerings of the philanthropic sector, we must first chose one of those offerings.
And, even as we analyze this choice, we come to another paradox. We cannot choose entirely freely; we necessarily choose as the product of our society and its current sectoral arrangements. In those arrangements, organizations in the philanthropic sector do not merely offer us competing visions of the good, social and individual; they also try to shape us according to the very criteria they offer us. The standard model of philanthropy has us seek to analyze and assess philanthropy as an adjunct to our society's other sectors; in the course of that process, we come to see ourselves as the products, not just the assessors, of our philanthropic sector.
This paper sets out to unpack these paradoxes of the standard theory, as a first step toward moving past them to a fuller understanding of philanthropy. Part I briefly examines our need for means of assessing as well as defining philanthropy. It shows how, across the whole spectrum of our wide-ranging interactions with philanthropy, we have always needed, never more than now, a means of making comparisons. It also identifies the two perspectives from which each of us views these issues: That of system evaluators and that of agents within the system -or, in Aristotle's terms, politics and ethics. contemplation of the Code. Thus, in the law of charity as in the law of nature, quantitative changes can become qualitative differences. At zero Celsius, water stops getting colder and becomes ice; so, too, though at an admittedly less precise tipping point, a charity engaged in too much non-charitable activity forfeits its entire exemption.
Less explicitly, a similar "state-change" must lurk behind the "relatedness" test for exempting business income; as anyone who has ever read copy in a museum catalogue can attest, the nexus between merchandise offered and mission to be accomplished can wear remarkably thin; beyond some point, surely, the attenuation must expose the charitable vendor to tax liability.
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Even in the notoriously glacial-paced development of charitable trust law, a distinctly quantitative test is emerging. The threshold for altering charitable purposes under the cy pres doctrine has inched forward from the common law's rigid standard of "impossible or illegal," past the more malleable "impracticable," toward the potentially fluid "inefficient." We still have, here, no precise definition of efficiency. 24 But at least a binary, all or nothing, standard is giving way to a more relativistic, quantitative measure.
Both proper budgeting for charity and proper performance monitoring of charity are all the more imperative in times of economic crisis (not to mention heightened political scrutiny). Budgeting and monitoring, in turn, both require comparisons, not only between organizations, but also over time.
B. Dual Perspectives.
In all the assessments we make of philanthropy, we take one of two basic perspectives. We look at philanthropy from above, as designers, describers, or evaluators of its role in our social system more generally. Or we look at charity from within, as individuals involved with philanthropy as members of our society. Although these perspectives are conceptually distinct, they are by no means functionally separate. To know how much to contribute to philanthropy, we must know how much "work" our society assigns, by design or by default, to philanthropy, and how well philanthropy is doing that work. We need to know where need is greatest, and we need to know how best to meet it with the means at hand. And yet, even as we make these decisions, we must bear in mind that they, in their turn, shape as well as reflect philanthropy's role.
These two perspectives, from "inside" and from "above," recall two complementary aspects of classical normative analysis: the political and the ethical. In the following analysis of philanthropy, we will see that, even as in Plato and Aristotle's analysis of society generally, personal virtue and political justice are intimately linked.
25
And we will ask whether philanthropy might be that link, or even more: perhaps the Archimedean lever with which we move our whole world.
C. Back to the Basic Question.
As individuals and as a society, we must make multiple comparative judgments about philanthropy: What is its role vis-à-vis other sectors? How well are particular philanthropies, and the philanthropic sector as a whole, performing their assigned tasks?
How much of our resources, personal and public, should we commit to the philanthropic sector, and how shall we allocate those resources among its constituents? All these questions point us back to the most basic one: What, exactly, are we assessing and comparing? What is philanthropy, and what is its function?
II. The Standard Model of Philanthropy's Function: Supplementing the Market and the State.
Order gives due measure to the members of a work considered separately, and symmetrical agreement to the properties of the whole. 29 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 28, at 5(with particular reference to ethics and politics, "a well-schooled man is one who searches for that degree of precision which the nature of the subject at hand admits: it is obviously just as foolish to accept arguments of probability from a mathematician as to demand strict demonstrations from an orator.") id. at 35 ("one can demand of a discussion only what the subject matter permits"); see also ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 3, at 93 ("perfection in everything can hardly be expected," with particular reference to Socrates's political ideas).
make that account more adequate for the task at hand, overlaying measures of philanthropic performance onto a workable account of philanthropy's function.
For all its explanatory power, the standard model has several implicit limits: It equivocates on the role of the household sector; it implies that the philanthropic sector is subordinate to the market and the state; and it obscures important implications of its essentially functionalist structure. This part takes up each of those limits in turn.
A. The Ambiguous Position of the Household Sector.
The standard model, as we have seen, implies four social sectors: the for-profit, which is for-profit and voluntary; the governmental, which is nonprofit and non- Fully to correct those slights to the household sector would, alas, require more time and space than is warranted by the additional light that the corrections would shed on philanthropy, which is itself something of a sectoral step-child. Thus this reconsideration of the standard theory will, like that theory itself, relegate the household sector to relevant footnotes and sidelights in the discussion of its sectoral siblings. Here, at very least, the slight is not without apology.
In defense of the standard model, its omission of the household sector may be a kind of backhand concession that the household sector is too basic, or too complex, for In what might be called the standard theory of the standard theory, this sectoral sequencing is almost completely innocuous, no more than an accident of the model's intellectual history and an artifact of its structure. To take the latter first, the idea is that 34 See Steinberg, supra note 33, at 119-27 (summarizing the "three failure theory" in the conventional order); id. at 120, Figure 5 ("Schematic of Three-Failures Theory" with markets at the top, government in the middle, and nonprofits at the bottom); see also an accident of intellectual history and an artifact of modeling a cycle or mapping a sphere. As long as we bear that in mind, the standard model's sequencing of sectors does no harm, or at least no avoidable harm.
As far as it goes, this benign view of the standard theory's sequence of sectors is accurate enough. Unfortunately, this view gives us far less than the full picture. It omits two significantly peculiar aspects of the standard model that we need to note, one here and the other in the next subsection. The peculiarity to note here is how seamlessly the standard model's sequencing suits a Lockean, even libertarian, conception of social 35 Steinberg, supra note 33, at 127 (noting that "[t]hree-failures theory does not presume any sector is 'first' and the other sectors react to its failures," but "rather, the approach arranges the three sectors around a circle, with each reacting to the failures of its neighbors.," although admitting that the standard presentation, beginning with the for-profit sector "perhaps falls short in developing our intuition about the whole circle."). 36 See Steinberg, supra note 33, at 118 (tracing the developments of the "three failure theory"). 37 See Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (1951) (describing how ordering of choices posed affects the ranking of choices made).
development, in which the order of sectoral development carries the most serious of normative consequences.
The standard model suggests something like this sequence of events. In the beginning, a happily autonomous set of householders found that they could improve all their lots if they specialized production by comparative advantage, then traded with other households for their respective needs. Thus they created the for-profit sector and behold, it was good. The happy free-holders then discovered that both their original property entitlements and their new system of inter-household trade could be made to work even better if they created, by mutual assent, a mechanism for precisely those twin purposes.
Thus they created a sort of night-watchman state; it, too, was good. Finally, as something of an after-thought, the Founders added the philanthropic sector, to provide anything they could not make at home, buy in the market, or secure by universal political agreement.
Just so, the standard theory leads us to believe, today's four-sector society developed naturally and properly from the voluntary interactions of aboriginal households in a generally Edenic "state of nature."
Presented this way, the standard theory is obviously reminiscent of John Locke's account of the origin and function of the state. 38 It simply adds to that account the idea that the philanthropic sector developed last, as a sort of stop-gap response to failures in the other, more significant, sectors. This amended Lockean account implicitly assigns those other sectors a priority in both time and right. The household sector is more primordial than primary, something like Paradise itself, the home the Creators create for themselves ex nihilo. To nurse and keep that garden for their greater delight, they create the for-profit sector. Finding that sector not quite fully self-fulfilling, they form the governmental sector, an Eve to the market's Adam. Though formed from essentially the same matter as the market --voluntary, self-interested agreement --the state is always secondary and subordinate, ever the help-meet, never the master. Last on the scene, as a sort of man Friday, is the philanthropic sector. A rather distant and residual fourth, of somewhat shadowy origins, it functions as a something of a general factotum, tidying up areas of the household beneath the concern of the master market and the help-meet state. 39 It hardly needs to be added of the whole arrangement: Behold, it is very good, the best of all possible worlds.
But some, or course, will always quibble. Hobbes, 40 Bentham, 41 and Calhoun, 42 to name but three, present a considerably less sanguine view of the state of nature; for them, humankind under the state and its laws is much closer to Pandemonium Ameliorated than Paradise Improved. We need not take a position here on that dated, if not dubious, "chicken-and-egg" debate, which modern political theory studiously attempts to skirt. 43 We need only to notice, for now, that the standard model's account of philanthropy has a distinctly Lockean bias, and to watch, later, for the implications of that bias in our fuller consideration of the model.
C. The Implicit Assumptions of Its Functionalist Approach.
The standard model's implicit chronology of sectoral development may be an accident or an artifact, but its normative assumptions about sectoral function are absolutely fundamental, if not always entirely apparent. 44 Fully to appreciate those normative assumptions, we must first notice an even more basic aspect of that model, its fundamental functionalism. As the name suggests, a functionalist model defines and assesses its objects, in this case philanthropy, in terms of their function, what they are supposed to do, and how well they do it, not in terms of any inherent or essential quality or form of operation in isolation. Thus functionalist models, as such, always ask "What is this good for," never "Is this good, period?"
The functionalist structure of the standard model, we should note here at the outset, offers several significant advantages for our analysis of philanthropy. Most significantly, it promises not only to provide both things we are looking, the "good" of philanthropy and a means for its measure, but also to reduce philanthropy's aim and metric to common terms. Every function will be assigned to the sector that performs that function best. does what it is supposed to do best (and its vice, conversely, the condition in which it does it badly, or not at all).
That structural parallel noted, we must quickly add a qualifier. Pointing to that parallel is not merely a matter of nostalgia or antiquarianism. That parallel is, rather, of the utmost analytic importance to our project, better understanding and assessing philanthropy. When we trace the parallel between the standard model of philanthropy and classical normative philosophy far enough, we reach a profound divergence. That divergence, in its turn, reveals a fundamental strength and weakness of classical normative philosophy and the standard model's functionalism relative both to each other and to the task at hand.
To get at this critical divergence, we need to consider exactly the question that the standard model of philanthropy asks itself: What is the function of philanthropy in our society? In posing the question just that way, the standard model implicitly takes both the goals and the performance criteria of liberal democracy and market capitalism as given, and, from those assumptions, derives both the function and the performance measure of philanthropy. The standard model thus analyzes philanthropy in a significantly conditional way, as the best complement to those other sectors. It does not declare, much less prove, either that the goal of the other two sectors is unconditionally But the standard theory has more than adequate room for deontological considerations as "sideconstraints": Performance of charity's proper functions, to produce its proper ends, could be constrained by requiring certain deontological values like honesty and forbidding some deontological vices like lying and stealing. See KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 40 (arguing for the wrongfulness of false promises as entailing non-universalizable motives). Thus, though the standard model, focuses on philanthropic ends, it need not hold that the "goodness" of those ends will always justify dubiously "right" means. 47 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 26, ("[E]very virtue or excellence (1) renders good the thing itself of which it is the excellence, and (2) causes it to perform its function well."); see also PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 32-33 (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books, Inc. 1968) ("Does there not seem to you also to be a virtue for each thing to which some work is assigned?"). liberal democracy in our governmental sector, market capitalism in our economic sector, Western nuclear families in our household sector. 50 From the common goal of those other sectors, giving people as much as possible of what they want, the standard theory 48 PLATO, REPUBLIC supra note 45, at 222 ("Do you know… that it is necessary that there also be as many forms of human characters as there are forms of regimes?'"); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS supra note 3, at 149 ("The goodness or badness, justice or injustice, of laws varies of necessity with the constitutions of states."). See also CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 13 (Thomas Nugent trans., Great Books ed., 1992) ("The laws of education will be… different in each species of government: in monarchies they will have honor for their object; in republics, virtue; in despotic governments, fear."). 49 PLATO, REPUBLIC supra note 45, at 222-75 (analyzing "timocracy," the regime that makes honor the highest end; "oligarcy," or plutocracy, which makes wealth the highest end; "democracy," which makes equality the highest end; and tyranny, the aim of which is injustice.); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS supra note 3, (analogous catelogue of regimes and their goals). 50 See WEISBROD, supra note 36, at 27 ("If the nonprofit sector exists to respond to diversity of demands for collective goods, is size relative to government should differ across nations."). See also Smith & Gronberg, supra note 9, at 234 (identifying four different types of regimes, the liberal, the corporatist, the social democratic, and the statist, classified according to the relative size of their government's social welfare spending and philanthropic sectors).
shows how philanthropy, for its part, should best function to advance that same goal. The standard theory does not, significantly, say that that goal is, itself, good. This is a critical point for our analysis. At this point the standard theory of philanthropy stops, even as classical normative theory takes another step. In stopping here, the standard theory cannot give us something that we, both in our quest for philanthropy's function and in our capacity as consumers and voters, really need, something that both classical theory and philanthropy itself promise us. Even as the standard theory consciously rejects taking this step with classical theory, it also explains why the most distinctive function of the philanthropic sector is to supply us with what we need to take that step.
To identify that next step, the step at which the standard model stops and classical identified as a category error. 52 The category error here would be this: To be able to ask the function of the heart, or the circulatory system as a whole, suggests a question that may have no such answer: What is the function of the sum of all the parts, a full human being? So, too, to ask the function of the economy or the polity may dubiously imply an analogous "meta-function" for all of society. But the fact that every element in a complex system has a given function does not necessarily imply that the system itself has 51 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, supra note 2; ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 51, supra note 3 ("But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at a good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good."); id. at 149 ("In all sciences and arts the end is the good, and the greatest good and in the highest degree a good in the most authoritative of all -this is the political science of which the good is justice, in other words, the common good. such a function. What, after all, is the function of the termite, alone or in its mound? So, too, even if every element in an artistic composition has its place, the composition as a whole -not to mention art itself --may have no such "place" in any "grand scheme." Art may be for art's sake, 53 even as human beings, individually or collectively, may be ends in and unto themselves, or may have no end at all, other than those they assign themselves. 54 The classical philosophers' conception of individual and social excellence may, we now suspect, have been less a discovery than a choice, even an invention 55 ; theirs may well have been one way to order ourselves and our world, but not necessarily the only good way, and maybe not even the best. What's more, whether their way was a matter of choice or discovery, we know, as they knew, that there are, in fact, alternatives; our own populist, consumerist society is one of them.
Thus classical normative philosophy comes to an impasse at least as serious as that of the standard model of philanthropy. Classical philosophy fails to give us proof that its reasons for preferring the order it offers are anything more than preferences; the standard model gives us no reasons for preferring one of philanthropy's global normative orders over another. That, fortunately, need not be the end of the matter.
III. Synthesizing Classical Norms and the Standard Model: Toward a NeoClassical Account of Philanthropy.
In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and the greatest good and in the highest degree a good in the most authoritative of all -this is the political science of which the good is justice, in other words, the common interest.
Aristotle, Politics. And that reminds us of Mencken's maxim: "there is always a well-known solution to every human problem -neat, plausible, and wrong." 58 Still, it would be wrong to say, following Mencken, that the standard theory is wrong; as far as it goes, it is quite right.
The problem with the standard theory -and perhaps with Mencken's maxim -is that, for all its elegance, it is simply too simple. The standard model, properly understood, does not so much fail as reveal its limitation: Our most basic questions about philanthropy take us to the fundamental ethical and political questions of classical philosophy, which cannot be answered from the perspective the standard model offers. For those answers, the standard model itself shows us that we must choose among the normative standards our philanthropic sector offers, and that we can only be guided in that choice by the philanthropic standards we choose. It also shows us that we cannot choose among those standards without both preferences and capacities shaped by all three of our social sectors, not least the philanthropic. The standard model, then, ultimately shows us this:
Philanthropy, what the standard model sets out to define and measure, becomes not only the source of standards by which we measure everything, including ourselves and our social world, but also a shaper of both, according to its own standards. From an
